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Abstract. We described a method to solve deterministic and stochastic Walras equilibrium
models based on associating with the given problem a bifunction whose maxinf-points turn out
to be equilibrium points. The numerical procedure relies on an augmentation of this bifunction.
Convergence of the proposed procedure is proved by relying on the relevant lopsided convergence.
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1 Introduction
The economic equilibrium model proposed by Arrow and Debreu [1] for a competitive econ-
omy implicitly assumes that the entire economic activity will take place in a single time span,
implicitly instantly. As soon as one includes the agent’s concerns about the future, one has
to consider a dynamic component and take into account the uncertainty about this future. Of
course, that’s bound to enrich the model, raising in the process a wide variety of modeling issues.
In this article we are only going to be concerned with numerical procedures to solve trimmed
down stochastic Walras equilibrium models where goods are transferred from time 0 to time 1
via “home production” which includes the possibility of simple retention; the extension of this
approach to include financial markets is presently under development.
The overall approach to the stochastic case is based on a result that allows us to proceed
with the calculation of the equilibrium for each particular state, a decomposition type approach.
This means that our first task is going to be the development of a method that will arrive at
an equilibrium rather efficiently in a deterministic, but dynamic, environment. We start with
the pure exchange model of Arrow-Debreu, next consider a two time-periods dynamic version
and then proceed to deal with the stochastic version of this model. We rely on an augmentation
method applied to what we call the Walrasian, essentially, the function ‘supposedly solved’ by
the Walrasian auctioneer and a maxmin characterization of an equilibrium point. The fact that
the theory allows us to proceed, in the iterative process, with approximate equilibria turns out
to be critical in the development of the overall numerical scheme.
Our approach deviates, even in the deterministic case, from the path-breaking methods sug-
gested by Scarf and Hansen [22], Eaves [8, 5], Saigal [21], and other approximation strategies
described in the books by Judd [15], and Brown and Kubler [6]. These earlier methods are not ef-
ficient when the economies have a large number of goods or agents, even for reaching approximate
equilibria. Moreover, in stochastic environments these results are prohibitively time-expensive.
In this paper we develop an approach based on an augmented Walrasian technique and a
lopsided convergence approximation procedure, which allows us to cope with large equilibrium
problems including uncertainty and heterogeneity on the agents. By using this approach we
have designed a two-phase algorithm without computing derivatives of the demand function.
We report several numerical experiments for equilibrium problems involving up to 5 agents, 7
goods and 10 stochastic scenarios, which can be easily expanded in number of agents and goods.
Finally, the procedure proposed in this paper might be parallelized in terms of agents and the
multi-start strategy.
2 The Arrow-Debreu model
To set the stage and fix terminology and notation, let’s start with the barter, or pure exchange
model, of Arrow-Debreu [7]. A finite number of (individual) agents i ∈ I with initial endowments{
ei ∈ IR
L, i ∈ I
}
, consisting of a finite number of goods, to be bartered so as to maximize, indi-
vidually, their upper semicontinuous (usc) concave utility functions
{
ui : IR
L → [−∞,∞), i ∈ I
}
that depend on the level of the acquisitions xi(p) ∈ IR
L of these goods, potentially for “consump-
tion”; one refers to Xi = dom ui =
{
x ∈ IRL
∣∣ ui(x) > −∞} as the survival sets; note that the
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concavity of ui implies that the survival set Xi is convex, typically unbounded. The value to
assign to each good, in this trading process, depends on a market price system 0 6= p ∈ IRL
+
that
will restrict each agent to limit the “market value” of its acquisitions to the “market value” of
its endowment, i.e., 〈p, x〉 ≤ 〈p, ei〉; since these prices don’t necessarily reflect monetary prices,
the “values” are often referred to as units of account. Given p ∈ IRL
+
, each agent maximizes its
utility subject to its budgetary constraint, i.e.,
xi(p) ∈ argmaxx∈Xi⊂IRL+ ui(x)
For the market to be in equilibrium the total demand must not exceed total supply, i.e., with s
designating the excess supply function,
s(p) =
∑
i∈I
(ei − xi(p)) ≥ 0.
Since, we haven’t ruled out the possibility that at equilibrium the prices of some goods might
turn out to be 0, one can also write this condition in terms of a geometric variational inequality:
−
∑
i∈I
(ei − xi(p)) = −s(p) ∈ NIRL+(p),
where NC(p) denotes the normal cone of variational analyis [20] to the set C at p, or still, must
be solutions of the linear complementarity problem,
0 ≤ p ⊥
∑
i∈I
(ei − di(p)) ≥ 0.
Since the budgetary constraints are positively homogeneous in p and p 6= 0, no additional restric-
tion is introduced by insisting that the price system should be scaled so that it lies in the unit
simplex ∆L =
{
p ∈ IRL
+
∣∣ 〈p, e〉 = 1}. This is often included in the formulation of the problem to
enable appealing to a fixed point argument to establish existence or to provide boundedness in
the design of a computational scheme.
Additionally, we introduce a natural bound for each agent demand function xi(p) ≤
∑
i∈I ei (see
[7, Ch.5]), i.e., no agent can demand more quantity of each good than the total amount available
in the economy, which in turn obtains a bound for s(p) > −∞.
3 Augmented Walrasian
Our assumptions, and notation introduced in the previous section, follow those of the article
“Continuity properties of Walras equilibrium points” [12] which introduced the Walrasian func-
tion associated with this problem
W (p, q) = 〈q, s(p)〉 on ∆×∆
where p, q ∈ the (unit) price simplex ∆ ⊂ IRn, and s is our excess supply function as defined in
the previous section. Moreover, the following lemma provides that every max-inf point of W is
an equilibrium price, i.e., if infq∈∆W (p¯, q) = supp∈∆ infq∈∆W (p, q) then s(p¯) ≥ 0 [12].
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3.1 Lemma (Walras equilibrium prices and maxinf-points). Every maxinf-point p¯ ∈ ∆ of the
Walrasian function W such that W (p¯, ·) ≥ 0 on ∆ is an equilibrium point.
Proof. If p¯ is a maxinf-point of the Walrasian with W (p¯, ·) ≥ 0, it follows that for all unit
vectors ej = (0, . . . , 1, . . .), the j-th entry is 1, 〈ej, s(p¯)〉 ≥ 0 which implies s(p¯) ≥ 0.
The condition ofW (p¯, ·) ≥ 0 follows by the definition ofW and noting that for every price p ∈ ∆,
and under local nonsatiation preferences assumption, W (p, p) = 0. Furthermore, the converse
of lemma (3.1) also holds, i.e., every equilibrium point is a maxinf-point of W [14, Prop.2.4].
Existence of equilibrium prices can be seen as the existence of max-inf points for the correso-
ponding Walrasian. Under general conditions for the upper-semicontinuity of the excess supply
function, it is easy to see that W is a Ky Fan function [2], and the existence of max-inf point is
provided by [2, Theorem 6.3.5]
Since our basic approach, first suggested by A. Bagh [3], is related to that for the augmented
Lagrangian, it’s informative to consider the bifunction that might have led to the Walrasian in
a standard non-convex duality scheme [20, §11.K]. Let’s introduce a pre-Walrasian obtained as
a restricted-partial conjugate, with respect to the q-variable, i.e., for all p ∈ ∆
V (p, u) = sup z∈∆ [ 〈u, z〉 −W (p, z) ].
V (p, ·) is clearly convex and one can think of the family of bifunctions
{
V (·, u), u ∈ IRn
}
as
‘perturbations’ of a ‘fundamental’ primal-problem
find pˆ ∈ argmax p∈∆ v(p) where v(p) = V (p, 0) = − inf
q∈∆
[W (p, q) ].
By conjugacy, since the functions q 7→ W (p, q) on ∆ are proper, lower semicontinuous (lsc)
and convex, so are the functions u 7→ V (p, u). Note that min q∈∆ 〈q, s(p)〉 will yield the q that
generates the smallest convex combination of the elements of s(p). So, if for any l, sl(p) < 0, it
follows that v(p) > 0. Thus, pˆ will be such that an element of the vector s(pˆ) will be as negative
as possible it will minimize the ℓ∞-norm of s(p).
The process of going from v to the collection {V (·, u), u ∈ IRn} is well-understood; it can be
viewed as associating to a particular optimization problem, max
{
v(p)
∣∣ p ∈ ∆}, a perturbed
collections that leads to the analysis of stability. But in our setting what is this particular
optimization problem? It can be viewed as the Walrasian auctioneer’s problem. It’s easy to
see that it’s optimal value is 0 which is attained when the Walrasian auctioneer has selected
a price system that yields an equilibrium. Generally it’s not a concave function, and certainly
not a strictly concave function, and thus one can’t expect a unique maximizer which, precisely,
correspond to the well-know fact that, in general, Walras equilibrium points are not unique.
In order to compute equilibrium points for an economy, we propose a strategy to find a max-inf
point of W by an approximating scheme. Our first goal is to build a family of approximating
bifunctions by relying on an augmentation technique. Let σ : IRn → IR be an augmenting func-
tion, i.e., it’s convex, argminσ = {0} and min σ = 0. Typically, σ = | · | is chosen to be a norm
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but depending on the application it could be quite different; recall that we can even choose σ to
take on the value ∞, for example, it could be a norm of some type restricted to a ball centered
at 0, or even more exotic.
Given the augmenting function σ and a scalar r > 0, the augmented Walrasian, by definition, is
W˜r(p, q) = sup u∈IRn
{
〈q, u〉 − V (p, u)− rσ(u)
}
.
For a fixed p, considering the convexity of V (p, ·) and σ, one can re-write the definition of W˜r as
a partial conjugate w.r.t the u-variable. Additionally, by the property of conjugation of a sum
and the definition of the epi-sum ( ), we have the following chain of identities
W˜r(p, q) = (V (p, ·) + rσ)
∗ (q)
= cl
{
((V (p, ·)∗ (rσ)∗) (q)
}
= inf z
{
(V (p, ·))∗(q − z) + (rσ)∗(q)
}
= inf z
{
W (p, q − z) + rσ∗(r−1z)
}
where σ∗ is the conjugate of σ, i.e., σ∗(v) = supx
{
〈v, x〉−σ(x)
}
. Thus, the augmented Walrasian
function in its final form is the infimum of a convex function, and depending of our choice of σ,
possibly quadratic or linear.
Additionally, we establish a definition for an approximating equilibrium point, given by a price
such that the associated excess supply function is close to satisfy the market clearing condition.
More precisely, the definition can be stated as follows:
3.2 Definition (approximate maxinf-points). For ε ≥ 0, pε is said to be an approximate equi-
librium point or approximate maxinf-point of W if infW (pε, ·) ≥ sup infW − ε, and the set of
all such approximating maxinf-points is denoted by ε-argmaxinfW .
Note that given an approximating equilibrium price, pε, one can adjust the agents’s intial en-
dowments by a fraction of ε and make pε and equilibrium price.
The next step is to establish a connection between the convergence of augmented Walrasian
approximating equilibrium points and the goal of finding an equilibrium price for the original
economy. Considering the family of augmented Walrasian perturbations, and a sequence of
their corresponding approximate max-inf points, one should be able to guarantee a convergence
result of this sequence of points, given the convergence of the family of augmented functions.
This condition can be obtained by appealing to lopsided convergence, or lop-convergence, of the
augmented Walrasian to the Walrasian. Given the compactness of the domain, one doesn’t have
to appeal to the (more comprehensive) definition of lopsided convergence it suffices to refer to a
more restrictive version, namely tight lopsided convergence; for the general definition and further
details, consult [13, 14].
3.3 Definition (tight lopsided convergence). A sequence in finite-valued bivariate functions,
fv-biv(IRn+m), defined over a compact set C ×D,
{
F ν : C ×D → IR
}
ν∈IN
lop-converges tightly
to a function F : C ×D → IR, also in fv-biv(IRn+m), if
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(a) for all y ∈ D, and all (xν ∈ C)→ x ∈ C, there exists (yν ∈ D)→ y such that
lim sup
ν
F ν(xν , yν) ≤ F (x, y),
(b) for all x ∈ C, there exists (xν ∈ C)→ x such that given any (yν ∈ D)→ y ∈ D,
lim inf
ν
F ν(xν , yν) ≥ F (x, y),
The desired convergence result for the equilibrium points follows from adaptating the tight lop-
convergence given by [14, Theorem 3.2], to our case with compact (and invariant) domains.
3.4 Theorem (convergence of maxinf-points, [14, Theorem 3.2]). Let C × D be a compact
subset of IRn+m. When the bifunctions
{
F ν
}
ν∈IN
lop-converge tightly to F , all in fv-biv(C ×D)
with sup inf F finite, and ενցε ≥ 0, then every cluster point x¯ ∈ C of a sequence of εν-maxinf
points of the bifunctions F ν is an ε-maxinf point of the limit function F .
In particular, this implies that in these circumstances, every cluster point of a sequence of
maxinf-points of the bifunctions F ν is a maxinf-point of the lop-limit function F .
In order to obtain our convergence result for approximating maxinf points, the following result is
an application of the previous theorem in our framework. It tell us that tight lopsided convergence
of the augmented Walrasian entails convergence of equilibrium points.
3.5 Theorem (convergence of ε-maxinf points). Suppose that p 7→ s(p) is usc on ∆. Consider
the non-negative sequences
{
rν , ν ∈ IN
}
and
{
εν , ν ∈ IN
}
such that rνր∞, ενցε ≥ 0. Let{
W ν , ν ∈ IN
}
be a family of augmented Walrasian functions associated which each augmenting
parameter rν . Let pν ∈ εν-argmaxinfW ν and p¯ be any cluster point of
{
pν , nu ∈ IN
}
. Then
p¯ ∈ ε-argmaxinfW .
Proof. It suffices to show that
{
W ν , ν ∈ IN
}
lop-converges tightly to W and conclude by
Theorem (3.4) the convergence of a (sub)sequence of εν-maxinf points. In order to prove tight
lopsided convergence, let q ∈ ∆,
{
pν , ν ∈ IN
}
→ p ∈ ∆. Define qν ≡ q, ν ∈ IN . Then
W ν(pν , qν) = inf z∈IRn
{
W (pν , z) + rν ∗ σ∗(qν − z)
}
≤W (pν , qν),
and as the function p 7→ s(p) is usc,
lim supW ν(pν , qν) ≤ lim supW (pν , q) ≤W (p, q).
On the other hand, let p ∈ ∆ and
{
qν , ν ∈ IN
}
→ q. By compactness of ∆, q ∈ ∆ and defining
pν = p, ν ∈ IN , W ν(p, q) is the inf-projection of the function F ν(q, z) = W (p, q− z) + rν ∗ σ∗(z)
in the z-variable. Thus, F ν is level bounded in z locally uniform in q and therefore W ν(p, ·) is
lsc by [20, Theorem 1.17]. Finally,
lim infW ν(pν , qν) ≥W (p, q),
since for any q0 ∈ ∆,W
ν(p, q0)→W (p, q0) as ν →∞ and the conclusion follows from a standard
diagonal argument.
The following inmediate corollary of this theorem, with ε = 0, plays a pivotal role form a
numerical viewpoint
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3.6 Corollary (ε-maxinf and equilibrium points). Let ενց0. Then, every cluster point of a
sequence of εν-approximating equilibrium points of a sequence of augmented Walrasian functions
is an equilibrium point for the original economy.
The major thrust of the eventual algorithmic procedures is to replace finding local near maxinf-
points of W by finding a local saddle point of a W˜ ν for ν large enough (but not too large to
avoid numerical instabilities). Under this scheme, there are several options for choosing the
augmenting function σ. For example, one can consider σ = | · | a norm whose dual norm will
be denoted by | · |o, then one can express the augmented Walrasian as
W˜ ν(p, q) = min
z
[
W (p, z)
∣∣∣ z ∈ IB0(q, rν) ∩∆ ] ,
where IB0(q, rν) is the dual ball with center in q and radius rν . Alternatively, for σ be the
self-dual function, i.e., σ = 1
2
| · |22, the augmented Walrasian takes the form
W˜ ν(p, q) = min
z
[
W (p, z) +
1
2rν
|z − q|22
∣∣∣ z ∈ ∆ ] .
There is quite a variety of procedures for finding these near local saddle-points. One possible
procedure to solve the problem at hand is described next:
• At iteration ν + 1, given (pν , qν) with r = rν+1 (≥ rν), the Phase I (or primal) consists in
solving
qν+1 ∈ argminq∈∆ W˜
ν+1(pν , q)
note that the ‘internal’ minimization is either that of a linear form on a ball, this seems to
favor | · |o as the ℓ
∞-norm, or the self-dual augmenting function which yields an immediate
solution.
• How to carry out the next step will depend on the ‘shape’ and the properties of the demand
functions. For example, this turns out to be rather simple when the utility functions are
of the Cobb-Douglas type, defining the Phase II (or dual) as finding
pν+1 ∈ argmaxp∈∆ W˜
ν+1(p, qν+1)
In virtue of the corollary (3.6), we know that as rνր∞, p
ν → p¯ a maxinf-point ofW , equivalently
an equilibrium price system for Walras’ problem. The strategy for increasing rν should take into
account (i) numerical stability, i.e., keep rν as small as possible and (ii) efficiency, i.e., increase
rν sufficiently fast to guarantee accelerated convergence.
3.1 Numerical implementation for the Arrow-Debreu model.
The proposed algorithm was implemented in Pyomo (Python Optimization Modeling Objects,
[10]), a mathematical programming language based on Python. The problems that we solve
come with the following features:
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• In order to describe the economy, we consider utility functions of Cobb-Douglas and Con-
stant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) type, and strictly positive aggregated initial endow-
ment for every good.
• For the selection of the augmenting function σ, we primarily considered the self-dual type,
given by σ = 1
2
| · |22.
• For the agent problem, everyone has to maximize a concave utility function over a linear
constrained set determined by budgetary constraint and nonegativity of the solution. This
problem is solved using the interior point method, Ipopt, implemented by [23] (which gives
satisfactory results for problems of this nature).
• Phase I consists of the minimization of a quadratic objective function over the simplex of
prices. This is solved using Gurobi solver [9], a state-of-the-art and efficient algorithm.
• Phase II is the critical step of the entire augmented Walrasian algorithmic framework.
We need to overcome the (typical) lack of concavity of the objective function. Thus, the
maximization is done without considering first order information and relying on BOBYQA
algorithm [18]. which performs a sequentially local quadratic fit of the objective functions,
over box constraints, and solves it using a trust-region method. All the examples were run
on a 3.30 GHz Intel Core i3-3220 processor with 4 GB of RAM memory, under Ubuntu
12.04 operating system.
In what follows, a set of numerical examples is described. The first example corresponds to
a toy model, wich turns out to be useful in the general description of how the algorithm acts in
every interation to get to an equilibrium price. The second one provides a direct benchmark for
the performance between our algorithm and a classical example in the literature, provided by
Scarf [16, Chapter 4]. This section ends with a larger example of an exchange economy (with
symmetric agents), reflecting the computational power of the augmented Walrasian approach.
3.7 Example (symmetric agents). To test the overall performance of the algorithm we start
with a basic example. Consider an economy of three goods and two agents, with utility functions
within the CES family, i.e.,
ui(x) =
(
3∑
j=1
(ai,j)
1
bi (xj)
bi−1
bi
) bi
bi−1
,
with survival sets Xi = [10
−3,∞)2, for each agent. In this first example, the agents are sym-
metric, i.e., their utility functions’ coefficients are equal, given by ai,j =
1
3
, i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, 3
and bi =
1
2
, i = 1, 2, as well as their initial endowments ei,j = 1, j = 1, 2, 3 , i = 1, 2. It is
easy to see that, by symmetry of the agents, the equilibrium price for this economy is given by
p∗ = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), and it is unique. Computationally, we initialize the algorithm at an arbitrary
point of the simplex, in this case, p0 = (0.12, 0.56, 0.32). The trajectory of prices {pν} and
excess supply evaluations s(pν) performed by our algorithm are depicted in Figure (1). The first
graph describes the price evolution, where each good is represented by a line (prices are scaled
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Table 1: Initial endowments for Example 3.8
Consumer Initial endowments eij
1 0.6 0.2 0.2 20.0 0.1 2.0 9.0 5.0 5.0 15.0
2 0.2 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 5.0 5.0 9.0
3 0.4 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 12.0
4 1.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 8.0 3.0 17.0
5 8.0 1.0 22.0 10.0 0.3 0.9 5.1 0.1 6.2 11.0
by a factor of 100). The second graph depicts the behaviour of the corresponding excess supply
function, where each good is again represented by a line. The adjustment process of the prices
shows the Walrasian auctioneer’s problem, where in every iteration, the algorithm identifies the
good of the excess supply function with the least value, and performs an iteration adjusting its
price for the next period. As the algorithm progresses, it converges to the equilibrium price.
Figure 1: Homogeneus Agents (Example 3.7)
3.8 Example (exchange economy; Scarf example). Consider the example described in H. Scarf
in [16, Chapter 4]: exchange economy involving five type of consumers and ten comodities. The
initial endowment for each agent is given by Table 3.8.
The utility functions correspond to the CES-type, for which the parameters aij and bi for each
consumer are described in Table 3.8.
Table 2: Utility parameters for Example 3.8
Consumer Utility parameters
ai,j bi
1 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.07 2.0
2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3
3 9.9 0.1 5.0 0.2 6.0 0.2 8.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 3.0
4 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 0.2
5 1.0 13.0 11.0 9.0 4.0 0.9 8.0 1.0 2.0 10.0 0.6
The algorithm was set with the self-dual augmenting function, and the centroid of the simplex
as the initial point. Additionally, the augmenting parameter is updated by rν = 1.259. The
trajectory of prices {pν} and the corresponding sequence of excess supply evaluations are depicted
in Figure 2. In this example, the convergence to an approximate equilibrium point for ε = 10−1
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is obtained within 37 iterations, taking a machine time of 114 [min]; for ε = 10−2, 53 iterations
were required taking 179 [min]. The price is given by
p∗ = (18.4, 11.0, 9.9, 4.4, 12.5, 7.7, 11.7, 10.2, 9.9, 4.3)
As in the previous example, the price sequence describes a trajectory that can be associated with
the Walrasian auctioneer’s problem. Similar results are obtained with different starting points,
as well as different augmenting sequences.
Figure 2: Scarf’s example (Example 3.8)
3.9 Example (large scale, symmetric agents economy). In this example, we consider a larger
economy, with a total of 50 consumption goods and 10 agents with homogeneous CES utility
functions defined over survival sets given by [10−3,∞)50. The starting price is a random point in
the simplex. As expected, the trajectory of the approximating prices {pν} converges to the unique
equilibrium price system, in which every good has the same price, i.e., pg =
1
50
, g = 1, . . . , 50.
The converge of the sequence of prices, {pν} and the corresponding sequence of excess suppy
functions {s(pν)} is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Large scale, symmetric agents (Example 3.9)
From the examples previously described, a crucial observation can be made regarding the
stability of the iterative process: the algorithm approaches an approximating equilibrum with
about half of the total iterations. This behaviour is robust in every simulation performed, and
one find a reason in the introduction of the augmenting function.
It’s noteworthy that, in all cases, after a few iteration, the procedure finds an approximate
equilibrium which one should be able to exploit when dealing with equilibirum problems in a
stochastic environment.
4 Dynamic deterministic equilibrium model
As a stepping stone to the solution of stochastic Walras equilibrium models, we are going to
rely on solving, efficiently, deterministic dynamic versions of the Walras equilibrium model. Our
starting point is a two-stage model that’s formulated as follows: Given a price system p = (p0, p1)
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with pt the price vector in vigor at time t, each agent i ∈ I determines its optimal consumption
plan x¯ = (x¯0i , x¯
1
i ) as the solution of the following utility maximization problem,
max
x0,y,x1
u0i (x
0) + u1i (x
1)
so that 〈p0, x0 + T 0i y〉 ≤ 〈p
0, e0i 〉,
〈p1, x1〉 ≤ 〈p1, e1i + T
1
i y〉,
x0 ∈ X0i , y ∈ Yi, x
1 ∈ X1i ,
where uti, e
t
i and X
t
i are the utility functions, the endowments and the survival sets for agent i at
time t = 0, 1. As in §2, the utility functions are assumed to be usc and concave, providing the
convexity of the corresponding survivals sets. The vector y determines a set of activities selected
by agent i at time 0 that requires an input of goods T 0i y and produces a deterministic output
T 1i y at time 1. The closed convex cone Yi ⊂ IR
m determines the set of potential activities that
are at the disposal of agent-i; in many instances one would simply have Yi = IR
m
+ but not neces-
sarily in general. One can think of the pair of matrices (T 0i , T
1
i ) as determining an input/output
(home production) process that could simply be savings including enhancements or deteriora-
tion, or investment-activities, and so on. Of course, the agent chooses y so as to maximize its
overall utility; note, u1i could include a discount factor that doesn’t have to be made explicit here.
The excess supply function s(p) = (s0(p0, p1), s1(p0, p1)) is given as usual as the difference be-
tween the total amount of goods available in each time period and the total endowments adjusted
by the goods used or generated by the input/output process, i.e.,
s0(p) =
∑
i∈I
[ e0i − (x
0
i (p) + T
0
i yi(p)) ],
s1(p) =
∑
i∈I
[ (e1i + T
1
i yi(p))− x
1
i (p) ],
where (x0i (p), yi(p), x
1
i (p)) is the optimal solution for agent i of its utility maximization problem.
The Walrasian, W : ∆2 ×∆2 → IR is defined by
W (p, q) = 〈q, s(p)〉 = 〈(q0, q1), (s0(p0, p1), s1(p0, p1))〉.
p¯ = (p¯0, p¯1) is and equilibrium price system if s(p¯) ≥ 0. As in the static (one-stage) model, it
can be shown that such a p¯ is a maxinf-point of the Walrasian and its existence is provided as
W is a Ky Fan function. One possible approach in finding such a maxinf-point is based on the
Augmented Walrasian approach described in §3.
4.1 Theorem (dynamic deterministic maxinf-points). Consider the Walrasian function W for
the previous economy. Assuming local nonsatiation preferences, every maxinf-point p¯ = (p¯0, p¯1)
of W is an equilibrium point, i.e., s0(p¯) ≥ 0 and s1(p¯) ≥ 0.
Proof. Adapting the same pattern of proof as in Lemma 3.1, for every price system p = (p0, p1),
〈p0, s0(p)〉 = 0 and 〈p1, s1(p)〉 = 0. Then, if p¯ is a maxinf-point of W , W (p¯, ·) ≥ 0, and it follows
that for vectors q = (ej, p¯1) defined for every unit vector ej , 0 ≤ 〈q, s(p¯)〉 = 〈ej , s0(p¯)〉+ 〈p¯, s1(p¯)〉
which implies s0(p¯) ≥ 0. Analogously, taking q = (p¯0, ej) it follows that s1(p¯) ≥ 0.
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4.2 Theorem (convergence of ε-maxinf points and equilibrium). Suppose that p 7→ s(p) is usc
on ∆. Consider the non-negative sequences
{
rν : ν ∈ IN
}
and
{
εν : ν ∈ IN
}
such that rνր∞,
ενցε ≥ 0 1. Let
{
W ν : ν ∈ IN
}
be a family of Augmented Walrasian functions associated
which each augmenting parameter rν . Let pν ∈ εν-argmaxinfW ν and p¯ be a cluster point of{
pν : ν ∈ IN
}
. Then p¯ ∈ ε-argmaxinfW . In particular, when ε = 0, p¯ is an equilibrium point.
Proof. The tight lop-convergence of the augmented Walrasian
{
W ν : ν ∈ IN
}
follows the same
arguments as those cwin the proof of Theorem 3.5 and the conclusion follows from Theorem 3.4.
4.1 Dynamic model: a solution strategy
For a fixed choice of activities yi, the two-stage deterministic model is essentially just an extension
of a one-stage problem. With yi = y¯i ∈ Yi, after dropping reference to agent-i, the problem reads:
max
(x0,x1)
u0(x0) + u1(x1)
so that 〈p0, x0〉 ≤ 〈p0, e0 − T 0y¯〉,
〈p1, x1〉 ≤ 〈p1, e1 + T 1y¯〉,
x0 ∈ X0, x1 ∈ X1,
In fact, the problem is then separable, i.e., it can be solved by maximizing separately in the x0
and x1 variables:
maxx0∈X0 u
0(x0) so that 〈p0, x0〉 ≤ 〈p0, e0 − T 0y¯〉,
maxx1∈X1 u
1(x1) such that 〈p1, x1〉 ≤ 〈p1, e1 + T 1y¯〉.
If these problems are of the Cobb-Douglas or CES-type, one can find (closed-form) explicit so-
lutions to these problems at negligible computational cost.
The agent’s problem can now be seen as finding the best y ∈ Y that will maximize the overall
rewards. With
r(y) = sup
x0∈X0
{
u0(x0)
∣∣ 〈p0, x0〉 ≤ 〈p0, e0 − T 0y〉}
+ sup
x1∈X1
{
u1(x1)
∣∣ 〈p1, x1〉 ≤ 〈p1, e1 + T 1y〉},
the agent’s problem can be translated to:
find y∗ ∈ argmaxy∈Y r(y).
We refer to this reduction as the transfer first approach and the algorithmic procedure to solve it
(nonlinear convex optimization problem) very much depends on the properties of r. In the Cobb-
Douglas or CES case, the function r is twice differentiable and one can find explicit expressions
1Note that the equilibrium case ε = 0 is included.
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for the gradient and the Hessian of r. When Y = IRm+ , the problem boils down to maximizing
a convex function on the non-negative orthant. Assuming further that r is differentiable, the
optimality conditions read:
for k = 1, . . . , m, y∗k ≥ 0,
∂
∂yk
r(y∗) ≤ 0, y∗k
∂
∂yk
r(y∗) = 0.
A number of specialized algorithmic procedures have been designed for precisely this problem-
type.
4.2 The Cobb-Douglas case
The utility function of agent-i takes the form
ui(x) =
∏n
j=1
x
βi,j
j with
∑
j=1
βi,j = 1, βi,j ≥ 0.
For p ∈ ∆ and assuming that the survival set Xi = IR
n
+, agent-i solution is
for j = 1, . . . , n, x¯i,j(p) =
βi,j
pj
∑n
l=1
plei,l;
the endowment of agent-i: ei = (ei,1, . . . , ei,n) and the utility attached to this solution:
ui(x¯i) = αi(p)
(∑n
l=1
plei,l
)
where αi(p) =
∏N
j=1
(βi,j
pj
)βi,j
.
For the dynamic model, once the activity levels y ≥ 0 are fixed, the problem becomes separable
(per-stage) and the solution takes the same form provided that y is chosen so that e0i−T
0
i y remains
non-negative, otherwise agent-i would enter the exchange market with a negative quantity of
certain goods. It’s implicitly assumed that the technology matrices T 0i , T
1
i are non-negative;
negative entries in T 0i would imply goods-production at time 0 and negative entries in T
1
i would
imply negative outputs would be generated by certain technologies at time 1. Hence, assuming
that T 0i y ≤ e
0
i , the solutions (consumption vectors) that result from the choice of y and p =
(p0, p1) ∈ ∆×∆ would be
for j = 1, . . . , n, x¯0i,j(p
0) =
β0i,j
p0j
∑n
l=1
p0l (e
0
i,l − 〈T
0
i,l, y〉);
where T 0i,l is the lth row of T
0
i ,
for j = 1, . . . , n, x¯1i,j(p
1) =
β1i,j
p1j
∑n
l=1
p1l (e
1
i,l + 〈T
1
i,l, y〉);
and consequently,
ri(y) = u
0
i (x¯
0) + u1i (x¯
1)
= α0i (p
0)
(∑n
l=1
p0l (e
0
i,l − 〈T
0
i,l, y〉)
)
+ α1i (p
1)
(∑n
l=1
p1l (e
1
i,l + 〈T
1
i,l, y〉)
)
As detailed in §4.1, the optimization problem for agent-i is reduced to
find y¯i that maximizes ri(y) such that T
0
i y ≤ e
0
i , y ∈ IR
m
+ .
This is a linear programming problem whose feasible region is bounded and non-empty; y = 0
is always a feasible solution.
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4.3 The Constant Elastiticity of Substitution case.
If the utility functions for agent i take the following form
u0i (x
0) =
(
n∑
j=1
(a0i,j)
1
b0
i (x0j )
b0i−1
b0
i
) b0i
b0
i
−1
.
u1i (x
1) =
(
n∑
j=1
(a1i,j)
1
b1
i (x1j )
b1i−1
b1
i
) b1i
b1
i
−1
.
Then, the KKT optimality conditions ([20],) are satisfied if, and only if, the budget constraint is
active. On the other hand, each agent must satisfy the constraint for feasibility T 0i y ≤ e
0
i . Then,
for a given a feasible y ∈ Yi, we can find an explicit solution, given by
for j = 1, . . . , n, x¯0i,j(p) =
a0i,j
(p0j)
b0i
∑n
k=1(p
0
k)
1−b0i a0i,k
n∑
l=1
p0l (e
0
i,l − 〈T
0
i,l, y〉);
where T 0i,l is the lth row of T
0
i ,
for j = 1, . . . , n, x¯1i,j(p
1) =
a1i,j
(p1j)
b1i
∑n
k=1(p
1
k)
1−b1i a1i,k
n∑
l=1
p1k(e
1
i,l + 〈T
1
i,l, y〉);
Defining for agent-i
for t = 1, 2, θti(p) =
( n∑
j=1
(ati,j)
1
bt
i
( ati,j
(ptj)
bti
1∑n
k=1(p
t
k)
1−btiati,k
) bti−1
bt
i
) bti
bt
i
−1
.
consequently
ri(y) = u
0
i (x¯
0) + u1i (x¯
1)
= θ0i (p
0)
(∑n
l=1
p0l (e
0
i,l − 〈T
0
i,l, y〉)
)
+ θ1i (p
1)
(∑n
l=1
p1l (e
1
i,l + 〈T
1
i,l, y〉)
)
This is a linear function of y. Thus, if Yi = IR
m
+ , the problem for each agent is given by
find y¯i that maximizes ri(y) such that T
0
i y ≤ e
0
i , y ∈ IR
m
+ .
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5 Stochastic Equilibrium.
5.1 The agent’s problem.
In an uncertain (stochastic) environment the agent’s problem two-stage problem can be formu-
lated as follows:
max
x0,y,x1
·
u0i (x
0) + Ei{u
1
i (ξ, x
1
ξ)}
so that 〈p0, x0 + T 0i y〉 ≤ 〈p
0, e0i 〉,
〈p1ξ, x
1
ξ〉 ≤ 〈p
1
ξ, e
1
i,ξ + T
1
i,ξy〉, ∀ ξ ∈ Ξ
y ∈ IRm+ , x
0 ∈ X0i , x
1
ξ ∈ X
1
i.ξ, ∀ ξ ∈ Ξ,
where, the utility functions are usc, concave and the survival sets are convex and unbounded.
Additionally, the set Ξ consists of a finite number of possible states (scenarios) and Ei{·} indicates
that agent-i is calculating the expectation with respect to agent-i beliefs, i.e., to each possible
state ξ ∈ Ξ, agent-i assigns a probability πi,ξ ≥ 0 such that
∑
ξ∈Ξ πi,ξ = 1. It’s possible,
although unlikely, that all agents have the same information about the future in which case these
probabilities wouldn’t depend on i. As before, the agents set up their trades in full knowledge
of the suggested price system, eventually an equilibrium price system,
p = (p0, (p1ξ)ξ∈Ξ);
in particular, p1ξ is known for every contingency ξ ∈ Ξ. Note that the goods required T
0
i y to
carry out activities at level y are still well determined, the output at time 1 is now stochastic,
namely T 1i,ξy. This reflects a more realistic view of the output process. Even in the simple case of
savings via buying certificates of deposit, bonds or stocks, their value at time 1 can’t be known
with certainty. This is even more so, if the activities are decisions involving manufacturing, the
marketing or distribution of goods (perishable or not) and so on.
The agents’ problems are thus (two-stage) stochastic programs with recourse [4] with stochastic
entries in the right-hand side 〈p1ξ , e
1
i,ξ〉, the so-called technology matrix T
⊤
i,ξ and the recourse
matrix p1ξ ; the recourse decisions are x
1
i,ξ. Under the ‘usual’ conditions that guarantee the
existence of an equilibirum price system, recalled in [12, 17], these stochastic programs are
necessarily feasible; note however that straightforward feasibility of these stochastic programs
doesn’t really require such stringent conditions, for example, one could rely on an adaptation
of the ample survivavibility assumption introduced in [11]. From the stochastic programming
viewpoint these conditions can be viewed as sufficient conditions to guarantee the relatively
complete recourse property. For our problem, this can be stated as follows: for every agent,
(dropping the dependence on i), for all ξ ∈ Ξ, there exists (x˜0, y˜, x˜1ξ) ∈ X
0× IRm+ ×X
1
ξ such that
e0l − x˜
0
l − (T
0y˜)l ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , L
e1l,ξ − x˜
1
l,ξ + (T
1
ξ y˜)l ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , L, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ
From the economic perspective, this assumption is weaker than the usual survability conditions,
and can be interpreted as every agent being able to survive or participate in the economy,
independently of the market prices.
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5.2 Solving the agent’s (stochastic) problem
There are many alternatives methods to solve stochastic programs with recourse, but in this
setup the use of the Progressive Hedging algorithm [19, 24] seems to have many advantages, in
particular because solutions of the individual scenario subproblems are so readily available, cf.
§4 with the Cobb-Douglas case.
The approach is based on relaxing, at the outset, the non-anticipativity constraint, namely that
x0 and y aren’t allowed to depend on ξ, and then, progressively enforcing this requirement. For
now let’s just limit ourselves to a description of the steps of the algorithm as it applies to the
stochastic version of the (two-stage) agent’s problem in the Cobb-Douglas case, generated by
the transfer first approach described in §4.
Step 0. Set ν = 0. Pick ρ > 0, y¯0 = 0, wνi : Ξ→ IR
m such that Ei{w
ν
i (ξ)} = 0.
Step 1. For all ξ ∈ Ξ, let
yν+1i (ξ) ∈ argmaxy
{
rνi (ξ, y)− 〈w
ν
i , y〉 −
ρ
2
|y − y¯ν|2
∣∣T 0i y ≤ e0i , y ∈ IRm+},
where
rνi (ξ, y) =α
0
i (p
0)
(∑n
l=1
p0l (e
0
i,l − 〈T
0
i,l, y〉)
)
+ α1i (ξ, p
1(ξ))
(∑n
l=1
p1l (ξ)(e
1
i,l(ξ) + 〈T
1
i,l(ξ), y〉)
)
and
α0i (p
1) =
∏n
j=1
(β0i,j
p0j
)β0i,j
, α1i (ξ, p
1(ξ)) =
∏n
j=1
( β1i,j
p1j (ξ)
)β1i,j
.
Step 2. If ξ 7→ yνi (ξ) is a constant function, stop. y
ν(ξ), for any ξ, of course, determines the
optimal activity levels and the corresponding vector and function [x0i , (x
1
i (ξ), ξ ∈ Ξ)] determine
the optimal consumption plans. Otherwise, set y¯ν+1i = E{y
ν+1
i (ξ)},
wν+1i (ξ) = w
ν
i + ρ(y
ν+1
i (ξ)− y¯
ν+1
i ),
and return to Step 1 with ν = ν + 1.
Note that the optimization problem in Step 1 is a quadratic program of a very simple nature
since it’s completely separable. After carrying out some elementary calculations, it can be written
in the form:
max
{∑m
j=1
(c¯j(ξ)yj −
ρ
2
y2j )
∣∣T 0i y ≤ e0i , y ∈ IRm+}.
One could rely on general quadratic procedures to solve this particular problem, but a much
more efficient procedure could be designed to deal with a problem of this particular type.
One final remark about this model is that it can be easily extended to the CES utility functions
case, using the same transfer first approach of maximizing r function. In this situation, is easy
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to see that the only difference is the sustitution of the linear coefficientes α by the ones given
by the CES parameters, θ. Furthermore, one can solve the general agent problem, relaxing the
dependence of x0 and y on ξ, and apply the enforcing procedure to progressively converge to a
deterministic solution.
5.3 Augmented Walrasian and approximating scheme.
In this section, we set the foundations of the augmentation techniques applied to the Dynamic
Stochastic Equilibrium Model. A description of equilibrium points as maxinf points of the cor-
responding Walrasian, as well as the approximation scheme based in tight lopsided convergence
of augmented Walrasian is provided. Finally, a general description of the computational imple-
mentation of the algorithm and numerical examples are analized.
As in the previous section, consider the stochastic equilibrium model, where given a price system
p =
(
p0, (p1ξ)ξ∈Ξ
)
, each agent i solves
max
x0,y,x1
·
u0i (x
0) + Ei{u
1
i (ξ, x
1
ξ)}
so that 〈p0, x0 + T 0i y〉 ≤ 〈p
0, e0i 〉,
〈p1ξ, x
1
ξ〉 ≤ 〈p
1
ξ, e
1
i,ξ + T
1
i,ξy〉, ∀ ξ ∈ Ξ
y ∈ IRm+ , x
0 ∈ X0i , x
1
ξ ∈ X
1
i.ξ, ∀ ξ ∈ Ξ,
which defines the individual demand function xi(p) =
(
x0i (p), (x
1
i,ξ(p))ξ∈Ξ
)
and the individ-
ual transfer vector yi(p). Additionally, the excess supply function for this economy s(p) =(
s0(p), (s1ξ(p))ξ∈Ξ
)
is defined as
s0(p) =
∑
i∈I
e0i − x
0
i (p)− T
0
i yi(p)
s1ξ(p) =
∑
i∈I
e1i,ξ − x
1
i,ξ(p) + T
1
i,ξyi(p), ∀ ξ ∈ Ξ
The Walrasian for this model is the function W : (∆×∆|Ξ|)× (∆×∆|Ξ|)→ IR defined by
W (p, q) = 〈q0, s0(p)〉+
∑
ξ∈Ξ
〈q1ξ , s
1
ξ(p)〉
A price system p¯ =
(
p¯0, (p¯1ξ)ξ∈Ξ
)
is an equilibrium price if s(p¯) ≥ 0, i.e., s0(p¯) ≥ 0 and s1ξ(p) ≥ 0,
for every possible state ξ ∈ Ξ. Then, a equilibrium point for the dynamic stochastic model can
be described as a maxinf point of the Walrasian. Again, the existence is granted by noting that
W turns out to be a Ky Fan function.
5.1 Theorem (stochastic equilibrium prices and maxinf-points). Consider the Walrasian func-
tion W for the previous economy. Then, under local nonstatiation of preferences, every maxinf-
point p¯ = (p¯0, (p¯1ξ)ξ∈Ξ) of W is an equilibrium point, i.e., s
0(p¯) ≥ 0 and s1ξ(p) ≥ 0, for every
possible state ξ ∈ Ξ.
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Proof. Considering that for every price system p = (p0, (p1ξ)ξ∈Ξ), under local nonsatiation pref-
erences, the excess supply satisfies the Walras’ law for the first stage and for every possible state
of the second stage, i.e.,〈p0, s0(p)〉 = 0 and for every ξ, 〈p1ξ , s
1
xi(p)〉 = 0. Thus, for p¯ a maxinf point
of W , W (p¯, ·) ≥ 0. Considering q = (ej , (p¯1ξ)ξ∈Ξ), 0 ≤ 〈q, s(p¯)〉 = 〈e
j, s0(p¯)〉 +
∑
ξ∈Ξ〈p¯
1
ξ), s
1
ξ(p¯)〉,
which implies that (s0(p¯))j ≥ 0 for all j. For the second stage, given an scenario ξ0 ∈ Ξ, it
suffices to take q = (p¯0, (p¯11, . . . , p¯
1
ξ0−1
, ej, p¯1ξ0+1, . . . , p¯
1
Ξ) and conclude by the same argument that
(s1ξ0(p¯))j ≥ 0, for all j and all ξ0.
For the problem of finding equilibrium points, we will follow the approximating technique de-
scribed in §3, where for a given Walrasian function W for the stochastic economy, we consider
the augmenting function σ, and an increasing sequence of positive scalars rνր∞, for which we
defined the family of augmented Walrasian bifunctions W ν as follows
W ν(p, q) = inf
z∈∆×∆Ξ
{
W (p, z) + rν ∗ σ∗(q − z)
}
,
and the algorithmic procedure relies in the idea of finding approximating maxinf-points of this
augmented Walrasian bifunctions for ν large enough. Finally, the following convergence result
will guarantee the approximation to an equilibrium point for the initial economy.
5.2 Theorem (convergence of dynamic stochastic ε-maxinf points). Suppose that p 7→ s(p) is
usc on ∆. Consider the non-negative sequences
{
rν : ν ∈ IN
}
and
{
εν : ν ∈ IN
}
such that
rνր∞, ενցε, for ε ≥ 0. Let
{
W ν : ν ∈ IN
}
be a family of Augmented Walrasian functions
associated wich each augmenting parameter rν . Let pν ∈ εν-argmaxinfW ν and p¯ be a cluster
point of
{
pν : ν ∈ IN
}
. Then p¯ ∈ ε-argmaxinfW . In particular, for ε = 0, p¯ is an equilibrium
point.
Proof. The proof follows from the application of the Theorem 3.4, as it was used in the con-
vergences results of sections §3 and §4 (Theorem 3.5, Theorem 4.2). Finally, the tight lopsided
convergence of the sequence
{
W ν : ν ∈ IN
}
follows from the same argument.
5.4 Numerical implementation and examples.
Computationally, we proceed with a primal-dual iteration scheme as described in §3. Especial
features for this type of economy are considered. In terms of the agent’s problem, we can adopt
a strategy solving the problem directly or solving it through the maximization of the overall
reward function r.
On the other hand, the agent’s problem is a stochastic program with relatively complete re-
course, for which Progressive Hedging algorithm is implemented. Exploiting the structure of the
agent’s problem given by the separability in terms of the different scenarios in the second stage,
combined with the progressive hedging approach, we provide two strategies, one sequential and
another one parallel. The efficiency of these strategies will be discussed later and will basically
depend on the size of the economy considered as the total amount of goods available.
Finally, the global strategy of solution adopted can be summarized in the following scheme:
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Step 0. Set ν = 0. Pick an initial price p(0) (for example, the centroid of the IRG-simplex for
each ξ ∈ Ξ), and an augmenting parameter r0 > 0. Define an strategy for the agent’s problem,
directly maximizing the utility function u(x0, y, (x1ξ)ξ∈Ξ), or indirectly maximizing the overall
reward function r(y). Additionally, defined the procedure for the Progressive Hedging algorithm
implementation, sequential or parallel.
Step 1. For all i ∈ I, compute xνi (p
ν) applying Progresive Hedging algorithm to the agent’s
problem with the proper choice of strategies. With this, compute sν(pν), and solve the Phase I
iteration for the primal-dual scheme:
qν+1 ∈ argmaxq
{
Wrν (p
ν , q)
∣∣ q ∈ ∆×∆Ξ},
which is a linear problem.
Step 2. Solve the Phase II, given by
pν+1 ∈ argmaxp
{
Wrν(p, q
ν+1)
∣∣ p ∈ ∆×∆Ξ}.
Finally, check the optimality condition: if min s(pν+1) ≥ −ε, stop. Otherwise, set rν+1 > rν and
return to Step 1 with ν = ν + 1.
5.5 Numerical experimentation.
5.3 Example (main example). The main example testing the numerical implementation of the
augmented Walrasian algorithm is described for an economy consisting of seven goods: skilled
job, unskilled job, leisure, consumption, risk free bond, and two stocks. We considered an
economy with five agents, with utility functions of CES type, and nine posible scenarios in the
second stage. On the other hand, the transformation matrices are the same for every agent at
the first stage given by T 0 = I and for the second stage are given by T 1i,ξ = diag(di,ξ) for each
agent i = 1, . . .I, with
d1,ξ = (0, 0, 1 + 3r/4, 0.7, 1 + r, R
1
ξ , R
2
ξ),
d2,ξ = (0, 0, 1 + r/2, 0.8, 1 + r, R
1
ξ , R
2
ξ),
d3,ξ = (0, 0, 0, 0.7, 1 + r, R
1
ξ , R
2
ξ),
d4,ξ = (0, 0, 1 + r/2, 0.9, 1 + r, R
1
ξ , R
2
ξ),
d5,ξ = (0, 0, 1 + r/2, 0.7, 1 + r, R
1
ξ , R
2
ξ).
where r = 3.25% and R1ξ ,R
2
ξ are given by the following table
ξ R2(+) R
1
(=) R
1
(−)
1.10 1.00 0.95
R1(+) 1.20 1 2 3
R1(=) 1.00 4 5 6
R1(−) 0.85 7 8 9
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Agents’ utility functions are CES type, with parameters can be found online 2, as well as their
initial endowments and survival sets. Additionally, we consider that every agent has the same
beliefs over the scenarios on the second stage, given by πi,ξ =
1
9
, i ∈ I, ξ ∈ Ξ.
The algorithm is initialised with p(0) as the centroid of ∆ × ∆Ξ, the augmenting function is
σ = 1
2
| · |2, and the augmenting sequence of parameters rν is given by rν = 1.259ν. The trajectory
of the prices {pν} for every iteration and the corresponding excess supply function {s(pν)} are
described in figure 4. The algorithm was set for direct solution for the agent’s problem and for
Progressive Hedging, a sequential approach was considered. It finished after 62 iterations, with
a total machine time of 28 [hrs].
Figure 4: Main example (Example 5.3), {pν} and {s(pν)}
6 Conclusions
We introduced a new optimization methodology that allows the computation of equilibrium
demand and prices for different economies. This new approach combines several elements of
variational analysis, such as the notion of lopsided convergence and augmented Lagrangian tech-
nique for non-concave optimization problems.
Following [12], we characterize equilibrium prices as maxinf points for the so-called Walrasian
bifunction for an exchange economy. The novelty of our approach relies in the approximation
of the Walrasian by augmented Walrasian. Then, the computation of equilibrium points follows
from the convergence of the sequence of maxinf points for the approximated problems.
We use this methodology to solve, as a prelude, the classical Arrow-Debreu general equilib-
rium model and, then, two periods exchange economies with uncertainty. For both models we
got convergence in every numerical example, including a large scale problem in the stochastic
case. A robust performance of the algorithm is always obtained, and it can be interpreted as a
direct result of the augmentation procedure. One can appreciate stability of the iterations: by
about half of the total iterations required to get a high tolerance-level solution. Furthermore,
different numerical scenarios were tested, varying the augmenting function σ and the augmenting
parameter r. The results observed in these variations were not considered significantly different.
The most efficient variant relied on the self-dual augmenting function with exponential growth
in the augmenting parameter. Finally, for the stochastic problem, we tested an implementation
of the algorithm based on a parallel computation for the agent problem.
The usage of the augmented Walrasian approximation for the computation of equilibrium
points can be extended for more sophisticated economic models, as the one presented in [11],
where financial markets, collateral, and retention goods are considered. Additionally, considering
the structure of the problems, computational strategies that consider an efficient use of a parallel
algorithm should improve the overall time performance.
2http://www.math.ucdavis.edu/~jderide/AugWal/AugWal.html
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